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Abstract
This paper first describes a few existing models for product and merchant
brokering and automated negotiation in the framework of agent-based emarketplaces. Our analysis shows that only simplest types of automated negotiation
protocols are currently presented online, whereas some powerful systems have been
already implemented in the product and merchant brokering field. Then we give an
overview of theoretical approaches to automated negotiation including game theory
based negotiation, multi-attribute utility theory based negotiation and auction
based negotiation. We also discuss some further challenges for researchers and
practitioners working in the field of automated negotiation in the framework of
agent-based electronic marketplaces.

1.

Introduction

An e-marketplace can be shortly described as online parallel to the physical
marketplace. It can exist in different forms including auctions, product exchanges,
online shopping markets and e-catalogs. There are also some specific characteristics
of e-marketplaces compared to the traditional marketplaces. In an online
marketplace, potential buyers and sellers exchange information about goods or
services, reaching agreements through information alone; physical goods and
services may be delivered to the customer later on, outside of marketplace. That
allows the buyers to search for the best from the huge number of products available
on the e-marketplace; merchants can promptly react on the situation on the emarketplace to satisfy potential customers in a more efficient manner. These new
opportunities and very rapidly changing environment of the e-marketplaces lead to
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the need of ever more sophisticated services to assist both buyers and sellers. In
particular, the buyers have to be provided with the mechanisms that first help them
to specify their preferences and then to search for the best possible choice based on
preferences specified by the buyers. In some cases, when the preferences both on
the buying and selling sides are vague, some automation of the negotiation between
buyers and sellers is useful. Automating negotiations gives rise to new challenges
for developers of architecture and software technologies underlying e-marketplaces.
One of the most popular and promising answers to the new challenges posed by
arising e-marketplaces is the software agents’ paradigm. The term 'software agent'
as used in this paper refers to a program that acts independently in the framework of
an e-marketplace in the interests of its user. It should be noted that there are
contexts in e-commerce in which both software agents and automated negotiations
are not adequate. If negotiations get too complex then automation is not the right
choice. Instead there should be support of human users who then have to conduct
the negotiation themselves.
According to [Nwana, 1996], the most important characteristics of software agents
are Autonomy (agents process their work independently and proactively without
the need for human management), Cooperation (agents are able to communicate
with one another, negotiating on certain issues), and Learning (agents are able to
learn as they react or interact with their environment and other agents). We point
out that agents acting on e-marketplaces are usually autonomous. Their capabilities
to cooperate differ from marketplace to marketplace. The focus of this paper will be
on the cooperation aspect. Namely, we consider a few existing models for
automated negotiation in the framework of agent-based systems and the most
important theoretical approaches to automated negotiation including game theory
based negotiation, multi-attribute utility theory based negotiation, and auction based
negotiation.
The term 'negotiation' as used in this paper refers to automated negotiation where
all parties involved are software agents. However, we do not assume that
negotiation is always a complex process including reasoning, proposals and
counter-proposals. For convenience a simple exchange of information between two
agents is also considered a negotiation.
Negotiation is an important part of commerce today, and automated negotiation will
be a vital part of electronic commerce in the future [Beem and Segev, 1997].
Despite this fact current e-commerce technology hardly supports automated
negotiation. The main reason is that negotiation is difficult, and automated
negotiation is even more so. To give only two of many examples highlighting this
difficulty, we refer to the following issues: the need for an ontology to describe the
negotiation’s objectives, and the need for the agents’ strategies for negotiation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review some
practical implementations of agent-based e-marketplaces designed for product and
merchant brokering and for automated negotiation. In section 3, we analyze some of
existing theoretical approaches to automated negotiation. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
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2.

Practical Implementations

According to [Guttman et al., 1998] agents in the field of e-commerce can be used
and are especially important for the three stages in the framework of their
Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) model: Product Brokering, Merchant Brokering,
and Negotiation corresponding to what to buy, who to buy it from, and how to
determine the terms of the transaction respectively.
Ideally, all three stages of the CBB model should be implemented equally well in
the framework of an e-marketplace. Though in the paper we are mainly concerned
with the negotiation aspects a short analysis of those e-marketplaces that only
provide tools for product and merchant brokering is given too.

2.1

e-Marketplaces for Product and Merchant Brokering

As the first example of an e-marketplace designed for product and merchant
brokering we consider the Frictionless Commerce online shop
[http://retail.frictionless.com/].
In the framework of the Frictionless Commerce system, the consumer is given an
opportunity to choose what to buy and who to buy a certain product from. The
technology used by the Frictionless Commerce enables users to search for
merchants selling the product based on value, not just price. Online consumers use
the Frictionless' Engine to initialize their agents by selecting individualized criteria,
such as product features and merchant services. Consumers' preferences can be
vague. In addition, consumers are asked to rate their preferences ranging from 'must
have' to 'not important'. On the merchant's side all preferences are crisp. The main
problem to solve is to rank the crisp proposals coming from the merchants
according to the consumer's vague preferences. The Frictionless' Engine solves this
problem using multi-attribute utility theory [Raiffa, 1982] thus helping the
consumer to determine what to buy and who to buy the product from.
Another system in the Product and Merchant Brokering field is the MATE (MultiAgent Trading Environment) agent-based e-marketplace presented in [Owen et al.,
1999]. The main difference of the MATE e-marketplace from the system described
above is that a purchasing assistant and the merchants’ agents are added to the emarketplace architecture.
The purchasing assistant supports a buyer both at the specification and the
evaluation stages of the product and merchant brokering. At the specification stage
the user inputs his preferences for the product features and the relative weights of
these features using a user interface. It is important to note that the user interface
specification is directly connected with the product ontology and thus dynamically
changes according to the product under specification. The user’s preferences for
some features may be vague, say, he or she specifies the price as an interval
between the reservation price and the maximum price. At the evaluation stage the
purchasing agent produce a ranking of merchants’ offers by using an evaluation
algorithm that takes as input the buyer’s preferences for product features, the
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relative weights for these futures and the merchant’s specifications. The evaluation
algorithm used by the purchasing assistant on the MATE e-marketplace is derived
from the multi-attribute utility theory [Raiffa, 1982].
One more important characteristic of the MATE e-marketplace is that every
merchant is also represented by an agent acting on his behalf on the e-marketplace.
The merchant’s agent provides a user interface for creation and modification of
product data in accordance with the product ontology as defined by the market.
Another, probably even more important, functionality of the merchant’s agent is the
automation of the complex process of selection the products from the merchant’s
database which satisfy both the buyers’ criteria and the business goals of the
merchant. On the MATE e-marketplace, fuzzy-logic matching [Zadeh, 1992] is
employed by the merchant’s agent to select the best match against a buyer’s
requirement specification, even when no exact match is possible.
Because the offers of the merchants in the framework of the MATE e-marketplace
all have crisp preferences there is no matter to negotiate; the main problems to
handle are to select the best offer and merchant on the base of buyer’s preferences
and relative weights for the buyer’s agent and to find the most suitable product in
the product database on the base of buyers’ criteria and merchant’s business goals
for the merchant’s agent. The methods and technologies used to solve these
problems (multi-attribute utility theory, fuzzy-logic matching) can be useful in the
process of negotiation too. Moreover the whole process of product and merchant
brokering can be considered to be a searching for the suitable partners to negotiate,
i.e. a ‘pre-negotiation’ step.
As we see several powerful agent-based e-marketplaces in the fields of Product
Brokering and Merchant Brokering have been already implemented. As to the
Negotiation step of the CBB model the situation is not so good here. In the rest of
the section we review some of the agent-based e-marketplaces with the negotiation
between agents.

2.2

Auctions

Online auctions are no doubt the largest class of electronic marketplaces [Beam and
Segev, 1997]. Because many online auctions can be regarded as multi-agent emarketplaces we discuss some of their common features.
The first example we consider is an English auction in the framework of eBay's
Auction Web [http://pages. ebay.com]. To sell something one has to provide a
description of an item together with some preferences including payment method,
where to ship, who will pay for shipment, minimum bid and reserve price (real
amount the seller is willing to accept for this item). In fact, by providing this
information the seller initializes an agent to negotiate about one issue (price) with
vague preferences (the price should not be less than the reserve price). For a bidder,
the auction system offers an optional "phantom" bidding service, called proxy
bidding, which is equivalent to initialization of a buying agent. In proxy bidding, a
bidder can confidentially enter the value of the maximum bid – his only vague
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preference (the price should be not higher than the maximum bid).
The eBay's Auction Web’s English auction with "phantom" bidding service can be
considered a multi-agent e-marketplace with negotiation between agents about one
issue (price), although of a very simple type.
One more example is the Fishmarket electronic auction house [Rodriquez et al.,
1997]. This academic prototype of an online auction has the age-old institution of a
fish market as the underlying model. Both software agents and human beings can
trade there. According to the trading conventions of Spanish fish markets the
downward bidding protocol or Dutch protocol is used. What makes Fishmarket
different from most other agent-based auction sites is that not only market-owned
agents with simple architecture and strategies are employed. In addition, userencoded buying and selling agents of arbitrary complexity may compete in the
auction through standardized Java agent interface applets.
Another interesting academic prototype is a free-to-use online auction called
eAuctionHouse that is one of the services of the eMediator system
[http://ecommerce.cs.wustl.edu/emediator/]. This auction supports several important
features including combinatorial auctions and bidding via software agents. In a
combinatorial auction bidders may place bids on combinations of items. This
feature is very useful if a bidder has preferences for bundles of items, as it may be
the case in electricity markets, equities trading and bandwidth auctions.

Kind of negotiation

Negotiation issues

eBay's Auction Web

English auction

Price

Fishmarket auction house

Dutch auction

Price

eAuction House

Combinatorial auction

Prices for combination of items

Table 1: Agents’ negotiation in auctions
When more relevant issues than just the price exist, it is perhaps not the right choice
in such complex circumstances to use auctions at all. Especially in the business-tobusiness area additional issues like terms and conditions, payment method, who
will pay for shipment, timings, penalties, etc. may play an essential role; sometimes
they are even more important than the price. In these cases the multi-issue
negotiation with vague preferences on both is more suitable, than an auction.

2.3

Multi-Agents e-Marketplaces

As an example of an agent-based system for negotiation we consider first the
Kasbah marketplace implemented at the MIT Media Laboratory [Chavez and Maes,
1996]. Users wishing to buy and users wishing to sell certain products in that
marketplace can initialize agents by specifying what they want to buy or sell, the
desired price, the highest acceptable price (for buying agents) or the lowest
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acceptable price (for selling agents), the date they want the transaction to be
completed and a negotiation strategy. The negotiation strategy for a selling agent is
specified by the ‘decay’ function the agent uses to lower the price over the given
time frame. Similarly, a buying agent is given a ‘raise’ function for the bids.
Negotiation in Kasbah is straightforward. After buying and selling agents have been
matched, buying agents offer to selling agents their current bids. Selling agents
compare the bids with their current prices and reply with either "yes" (if one of bids
is accepted) or "no" (if all bids are rejected). In the last situation, in a specified time
interval, selling agents lower the prices and buying agents raise the bids according
to their negotiation strategies. The procedure of offering the bids and comparing the
bids with current prices is repeated until an agreement is reached or the time is up.
The Kasbah e-marketplace can be considered a multi-agent e-marketplace with
multilateral and one-issue (price) negotiation and vague preferences on both sides.
Selling agents have a span from the desired price to the lowest acceptable price, and
buying agents have a span from the desired price to the highest acceptable price.
Kind of negotiation

Negotiation issues

Kasbah

Negotiation through proposals; no
critique and counter-proposals

Price

Tete-a-Tete
(not finished)

Negotiation through proposals,
critique and counter-proposals

Price and other value-added services
(warranties, delivery times, return policies)

ZEUS-based
e-marketplace

Negotiation through proposals; no
critique and counter-proposals

Price

Table 2: Agents’ negotiation on multi-agent e-marketplaces
Many real-world commercial negotiations have multi-issue character. As a response
to this challenge and as continuation of the Kasbah project, a new project, Tete-aTete, was started at the MIT Media Laboratory [Guttman and Maes, 1998]. The aim
of this project was to extend Kasbah towards a multi-agent system in retail sales
with multi-issue negotiation, including warranties, delivery times, service contracts,
return policies and other merchant's value-added services.
Initially it was intended to allow vague preferences on both sides (consumer and
merchant) and negotiation with proposals, critique and counter-proposals. Due to
several reasons the Tete-a-Tete project was later transformed into the Frictionless
Commerce project discussed above.
One reason for the transition from the Tete-a-Tete marketplace to the Frictionless
Commerce Engine was that each of the two negotiating sides in business-toconsumer e-commerce has a different status and non-degenerate multi-issue
negotiation with vague preferences on both sides is neither practical nor really
necessary. Secondly, the complexity of the negotiation problem in the Tete-a-Tete
marketplace is substantially higher than in the Kasbah marketplace so that the
solutions used in the Kasbah project were not directly applicable to the initial Tete513
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a-Tete project.
Finally we mention a recent project described in [Collis and Lee, 1998]. This
project has been resulted in a prototype of a multi-agent e-marketplace with oneissue (price) negotiation and vague preferences on both sides. The new and interesting thing about this project is that the authors used the ZEUS Agent Building
Toolkit for implementation of the multi-agent e-marketplace. The description of the
ZEUS Agent Building Toolkit can be found in [Collis and Lee, 1998].

3.

Theoretical Approaches

In this section, we give an overview and a short analysis of some theoretical
approaches to automated negotiation including game theory based negotiation,
auction based negotiation, and multi-attribute utility theory based negotiation.
These approaches are of great importance both for the existing implementations of
the agent-based e-marketplaces and for the future projects in this field.

3.1

Game Theory Based Bargaining

The sub-field of microeconomics known as game theory is widely acknowledged to
provide a useful set of tools for the design of multi-agent architectures (Binmore
and Vulkan, 1999).
In the framework of game theory traditionally two main branches are distinguished:
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. A topic like coalition formation is
typically analyzed by cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative game theory deals
largely with how intelligent individuals interact with one another in an effort to
achieve their own goals. That is the branch of game theory we discuss here.
One way to describe a game is by listing the players (or individuals) participating in
the game, and, for each player, listing the alternative choices (called actions or
strategies) available to that player. In the case of a two-player game, the actions of
the first player form the rows, and the actions of the second player the columns, of a
matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing the utility or payoff
to the first and second player respectively. A play consists of choosing certain
strategies by the players; an outcome of the play is a pair of numbers representing
the utilities of the players. To determine “rational” outcomes non-cooperative game
theory defines the notion of an equilibrium strategy. Among most widely used
concepts of equilibrium strategies are the Nash equilibrium and ‘dominant’
strategies. A dominant strategy is optimal for all players independent of what the
strategies of the other players are. The strategies of players are in Nash equilibrium
if no player can benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Unfortunately, not every game possesses a dominant strategy and the strategies
being in Nash equilibrium cannot always be interpreted as the most suitable ones. A
very famous example is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game, there exists a
pair of strategies (non-dominant and not in Nash equilibrium) that are more suitable
for both players than another pair of strategies that are in Nash equilibrium. The
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Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrates that a mathematical definition of a “rational”
outcome of a game and thus results of mathematical analysis of negotiation
strategies supplied by the game theory cannot always be applied to practical
problems.
Another limitation appearing by applications of game theory is that, at least in
classical game theory, frequently simplifying assumptions are made for analysis of
a game like the assumption about the full rationality of the players and the
assumption that the rules of the play and the preferences and beliefs of the players
are their ‘common knowledge’. Such assumptions limit the practical applicability of
game-theoretic results. In particular, private information such as reservation prices,
preferences for different features of the products and the relative importance of
these futures as well as time preferences and limitations are usually hidden from the
opponent in real-life negotiations.
In the past decades a variety of bargaining models has been developed in the
framework of game theory. In particular, a lot of research was made in the fields of
cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining with incomplete and vague
information, and bargaining over multiple issues. One of the approaches is to
specify a limited number of player “types”, each with a set of preferences and
beliefs about the behavior of the other agents. Giving the distribution of beliefs the
probability theory is applied to represent the uncertainty of outcomes, and the
Bayesian law is frequently used to model the way in which new information revises
beliefs. For the overview of the results and literature in other fields of game theory
we refer to [Gerding et al., 2000].
Advantages

Critical Points

Provides a classification of
negotiation

The notion of equilibrium strategy is not
unique

In many situations, complete
mathematical analysis is possible

Mathematically optimal solution is not always
the most suitable one for practice

Bargaining with uncertain and
Simplifying assumptions are frequently made
vague information can be modeled
Table 3: Game theory based bargaining

3.2

Auction Based Negotiation

The common view among economists is that an auction is the most effective way of
resolving the “one to many” bargaining problem, both in theory and in practical
applications. In this section we give a short overview of the auction types that are
most widely used in online auctions and analyze them from the point of view of
agents’ negotiation.
According to the results of a field survey of 100 auctions presented in [Beam and
Segev, 1997] four basic types of single auctions (auctions with a single seller) can
515

Susanne Klaue, Karl Kurbel, Iouri Loutchko

be found online: the ascending bid auction (English auction), the descending bid
auction (Dutch auction), the first price sealed bid auction, and the second price
sealed bid auction (the Vickrey auction).
In the English auction, the buyers successively raise the bids up to their reservation
prices until only one buyer remains. In a standard terminology, the buyer’s
reservation price is the maximum price he is willing to pay for the item and the
seller’s reservation price is the lowest acceptable sale price for the item. Then, if a
buyer's maximum bid meets or exceeds the seller’s reservation price, the transaction
between the seller and the buyer is completed. All buyers can see the high bid and,
in some auctions, other buyers’ bids. The rules of the English auction are easy to
understand and to implement in the framework of an online auction. As a result, this
auction type is the most popular among online auctions both without and with agent
support.
In the descending bid auction (Dutch auction) the seller starts at a very high price,
and then lowers the price continuously. All buyers can see the current price and
then decide if the price is still too high or if they wish to purchase at that price. The
first bidder at the current price wins the auction. As shown in [Rodriquez et al.,
1997], the Dutch auction can be implemented as an agent-based online auction, too.
In the first price sealed bid auction each buyer independently submits in secret a
single bid. Then bids are opened simultaneously and the item is sold to the buyer
who makes the highest bid. Nobody is allowed to update a bid once submitted, and
the winner pays the highest price bid.
The Vickrey auction is similar to the first sealed bid auction. Each buyer
independently submits a single bid, without seeing bids of other buyers, and the
winner is the buyer with the highest bid. However, the price paid by the winner is
the second-highest bid.
Both the first price sealed bid auctions and the Vickrey auctions don’t allow buyers
to update dynamically their bids. That makes agent technology in general and
agents’ negotiation in particular hardly advantageous for these auction types.
Advantages

Critical Points

One-to-many negotiation

One-issue (price) negotiation

Mathematically optimal strategies can be Theoretical results can not always be applied in
found both for sellers and for buyers
practice
Bargaining with uncertain
information can be modeled

and

vague

Simplifying assumptions are frequently made

Table 4: Auction based negotiation
Auction theory provides us with an understanding of the conditions under which the
various auction types are optimal and which strategies are optimal for participants
in different auctions. For example, if all buyers participating in a first price sealed
bid auction are perfectly rational then, under some additional conditions, the
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buyer’s optimal bid is (n-1)r/n, where n is the number of buyers participating in the
auction and r is the buyer’s reservation price. For more details about optimal
strategies of buyers and sellers participated in different auctions we refer to [Beam,
Segev and Shanthikumar, 1996].
However, in the real word, all buyers are seldom equally well-informed, skilled and
perfectly rational, so that the results obtained from the mathematical analysis of
auctions not always lead to the best bidding strategies in practice.

3.3

Multi-Attribute Utility Theory

As we have seen in Section 2.1, some e-marketplaces for product and merchant
brokering have been designed for helping the consumer to determine what to buy
and who to buy the product from according to consumer’s preferences. Some of
consumer’s preferences can be vague. In this case, the multi-attribute utility theory
is normally used to rank the crisp proposals coming from the merchants according
to the consumer's vague preferences. In the more general situation of multi-lateral
negotiation with many issues and with vague preferences both by buyers and
sellers, the same problem should be treated, namely, to rate the offers coming from
the negotiation partners according to own vague preferences.
In this section, following [Raiffa, 1982], we present some elements of the multiattribute utility theory. We suppose that m participants take part in the negotiation
and the negotiation subject can be characterized by n issues, all of them of
i
numerical nature. Let x j denote the value for issue j (j = 1,...,n) offered to the
negotiation participant i (i = 1,m) by another participant at some moment. In
i
i
i
general, an interval of values is acceptable by each participant, i.e., a j ≤ x j ≤ b j , j
=1,...,n, i = 1,...,m. Different values from this interval can be of different worth for
every negotiation participant. The worth of values of negotiation issues is modeled
by scoring functions:

S ij : [a ij , b ij ] → [0,1], j = 1,...,n, i = 1,...,m.
The bigger the value of a scoring function for a certain value of an issue is, the
more suitable is this value for the negotiation participant.
In a real negotiation, different negotiation issues are of different importance for
every negotiation participant. To model this, we introduce the notion of relative
i
importance that a participant assigns to each issue under negotiation. Let ω j be the
relative importance of issue j, j = 1,...,n, for the participant i, i = 1,...,m. For
convenience, we assume that the normalization relation is valid:
n

∑ω
j =1

i
j

= 1, i = 1,...,m.

Now we suppose that negotiation participant i, i = 1,...,m, is given an offer. Because
the negotiation is characterized by n issues, the offer can be represented by a vector
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x = ( x1 ,..., xn ). Using the scoring functions and relative importance of issues
under negotiation we can introduce the notion of a general scoring function:

S i ( x ) = F i ( x, S1i ( x ),..., S ni ( x ), ω1i ,..., ω ni ), F i : R 3n → R, i = 1,...,m.
The exact form of scoring functions depends on a concrete situation. In many cases,
linear function can be used to model the utility:
n

S i ( x ) = ∑ ω ij S ij ( x ), i = 1,...,m.
j =1

This situation is the simplest one from the mathematical point of view. If all
negotiators use the linear scoring functions, it is possible to compute the optimum
value of x (see [Raiffa, 1982]) giving theoretical value for the ‘best deal’.
In a real negotiation, however, the final result achieved in the process of negotiation
will depend on negotiation strategies, even in the case of linear scoring functions.
Advantages

Critical Points

Many-to-many multilateral negotiation

Scoring functions are problem- and user-dependent

For linear scoring functions, optimal value
of the ‘best deal’ can be found

For non-linear scoring functions, the mathematical
analysis is very difficult

Bargaining with uncertain and vague
information can be modeled

No general recommendations how to construct the
negotiation strategies

Table 5: Multi-attribute utility based negotiation

4.

Summary

Most of today’s multi-agent systems on the Internet use simple and static
negotiation rules and are designed to negotiate about the price, not about the
warranties, delivery times, service contracts, return policies and other merchant’s
value-added services. Methods and tools to process vague preferences and uncertain
information are rarely used. This is definitely a shortcoming since the ability to
negotiate and make decisions in a vague environment can be regarded as one of the
main characteristics of an agent acting on an electronic marketplace.
The conventional approaches often used to model and analyze negotiation, like
game theory or auction theory, are hardly useful for modeling of multi-lateral
negotiation about many issues and with vague preferences and uncertain
information on either negotiating side. New ideas in this field are required. Using
multi-attribute utility theory in the framework of the multi-agent negotiation seems
to be very promising.
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